How to read DMARC reports: every field, and what to do about each sender
How to read DMARC reports: turn on rua, read each record field by field, sort senders into ours and not ours, fix each one and move to p=reject.

How to read DMARC reports: in each daily file a receiving mail server sends you, check every record's source IP address, message count, SPF and DKIM results, whether either aligned with your From domain, and what the receiver did with the mail. Then sort every sender into three groups: ours and passing, ours and failing, and not ours.
At a mid-size or large company, many services send as your domain, so the real work is sorting the senders. For what DMARC is and how to write the record, see our guide to DMARC policy not enabled.
What is a DMARC aggregate report?
It is a summary, usually daily, from each mail receiver that takes part, of the mail it saw using your domain in the From address. Its format is set by RFC 9990, published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in May 2026 with the current DMARC standard, RFC 9989. Together they replace RFC 7489, the 2015 version most older guides describe.
Each arrives as an email attachment: an XML file, usually compressed, named for the receiver, your domain and the period. A report covers one policy domain; subdomains without their own DMARC record appear inside the parent's report. The standard says reports "do not contain personal information": no individual addresses and no message content.
Failure reports (the ruf tag) describe single failed messages, and RFC 9989 notes that receivers concerned about privacy redact them heavily "or not send them at all."
How do you turn on DMARC reports?
Add an rua tag to your DMARC record. Without one, receivers "MUST NOT generate aggregate feedback reports" for your domain.
_dmarc.example.com. IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-reports@example.com"
Make three decisions first:
- Where reports land. Use a shared mailbox that the security or IT team owns, not one person's inbox. The record is public, so the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) warns in its trustworthy email guide, SP 800-177 Rev. 1, that the mailbox "could be subject to voluminous unsolicited bulk email" and needs spam controls.
- Who else gets them. One rua tag can list several mailto addresses, separated by commas. An address at another domain, such as a report service's, counts only if that domain publishes a TXT record named example.com._report._dmarc followed by its own domain, confirming it accepts your reports. Otherwise receivers ignore it.
- Which domains. Every registered domain you own, sending or not, needs a record; subdomains use the parent's unless they have their own.
What does a DMARC report look like?
A trimmed example for one day (all names and addresses are reserved for documentation):
<feedback xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0">
<report_metadata>
<org_name>Example Receiver</org_name>
<date_range><begin>1794441600</begin><end>1794527999</end></date_range>
</report_metadata>
<policy_published>
<domain>example.com</domain><p>none</p><testing>n</testing>
</policy_published>
<record>
<row>
<source_ip>192.0.2.10</source_ip><count>1250</count>
<policy_evaluated><disposition>none</disposition><dkim>pass</dkim><spf>pass</spf></policy_evaluated>
</row>
<identifiers><header_from>example.com</header_from><envelope_from>example.com</envelope_from></identifiers>
<auth_results>
<dkim><domain>example.com</domain><selector>s1</selector><result>pass</result></dkim>
<spf><domain>example.com</domain><result>pass</result></spf>
</auth_results>
</record>
<record>
<row>
<source_ip>192.0.2.25</source_ip><count>310</count>
<policy_evaluated><disposition>none</disposition><dkim>fail</dkim><spf>fail</spf></policy_evaluated>
</row>
<identifiers><header_from>example.com</header_from><envelope_from>billing.example</envelope_from></identifiers>
<auth_results>
<dkim><domain>billing.example</domain><selector>bl1</selector><result>pass</result></dkim>
<spf><domain>billing.example</domain><result>pass</result></spf>
</auth_results>
</record>
</feedback>
The first record is your own server: SPF and DKIM passed for example.com, so both aligned. The second is a billing service sending as example.com. SPF and DKIM passed, but for the service's own domain, so neither aligned and DMARC failed. At p=none the receiver delivered those 310 messages anyway; at p=reject they could be refused.
How do you read each field?
| Field | What it means | Example value | What to do |
|---|---|---|---|
| org_name, date_range | The receiver, and the day covered, in seconds since 1970 (UTC) | 1794441600 to 1794527999 | Convert to a date |
| domain, p, sp, np, testing | The policy the receiver found | example.com, p=none, testing=n | Check it matches what you published |
| source_ip | The server that connected | 192.0.2.10 | Find out who runs it |
| count | Messages from that server with these results | 1250 | Work from the largest down |
| disposition | What the receiver did: none, pass, quarantine or reject | none | At p=none, expect none on every row |
| policy_evaluated dkim, spf | DMARC's view: pass only if aligned with the From domain | pass, pass | One aligned pass is enough |
| header_from | The From domain readers see | example.com | The domain you are protecting |
| envelope_from | The bounce domain SPF checked | example.com | A service's own domain here can't align |
| auth_results dkim, spf | Raw results before alignment, with each domain checked (and DKIM's selector) | example.com, s1, pass | A pass for another domain doesn't count |
| reason | Why the receiver didn't apply your policy | local_policy | mailing_list or trusted_forwarder usually means forwarding |
The report schema keeps the disposition "pass" for passing mail under an enforcing policy, so at p=none, use the policy_evaluated results to tell passing from failing. In the raw SPF results, temperror is a DNS hiccup where "A later retry may succeed", while permerror "definitely requires DNS operator intervention".
How do you sort the senders in a report?
Group rows by service, not by IP address. The DKIM domain and selector, the envelope domain and a reverse lookup of the address (dig -x 192.0.2.25) usually name it. Selectors let one domain publish several keys, including, as RFC 6376 notes, one for an outside provider. Check each against your list of senders, built as in our guide to what an SPF record is.
Then use the three groups RFC 9989 sketches in its example of using aggregate data:
- Ours and passing: a known service with at least one aligned pass. The standard says this data is used "to validate that their authentication practices remain accurate", so watch it for drops.
- Ours and failing: a known service without an aligned pass, like the billing service above. RFC 9989 says legitimate mail like this must be fixed before you move to quarantine or reject.
- Not ours: a server no team claims, usually failing both checks. Before calling it spoofing, ask payroll, the help desk, marketing and each regional office. If nobody claims it, CISA's guidance under Binding Operational Directive 18-01 advises you to "avoid deep analysis on those systems that are not authorized to send mail as your domain" and to treat them as a reason to reach p=reject.
Forwarding and mailing lists look like failures but aren't yours to fix: your mail arrives from someone else's server, so SPF fails, while DKIM often still passes.
At company scale, keep the result in a register (a shared spreadsheet is enough): service, owner, sending addresses or domains, group, fix and due date. As in our email security checklist for IT and finance teams, every open item gets one owner and a date.
How do you fix each kind of finding?
- SPF and DKIM pass, but only for the service's domain. Turn on DKIM signing with your domain in that service and publish its key. If it offers a custom bounce domain under yours, such as bounces.example.com, use that too, so SPF aligns.
- DKIM fails for your domain. The key at that selector is usually missing, replaced or cut short in DNS. Republish it exactly as the service shows it.
- SPF fails for a server you run. Add its address to your SPF record and stay within 10 DNS lookups.
- SPF permerror. The record itself is broken, often by a second SPF record, too many lookups or a syntax error.
- An error element in the report metadata. Your DMARC record has a problem; RFC 9990 gives an invalid rua and more than one DMARC record as examples.
- Not ours. Nothing to fix at the sender; a stricter policy is the fix.
After each fix, check the next day's reports for that service before you mark it done.
When can you move from p=none to quarantine and reject?
When every service you claim has stayed in the passing group through a full sending cycle, monthly statements and year-end forms included. RFC 9989 says it may take many months of reports. For domains whose users post to mailing lists, it advises at least a month at p=none, then as long at p=quarantine, comparing the results.
- Set p=quarantine. Adding t=y first asks receivers to apply one level less while you test; reports then give the reason policy_test_mode.
- Watch the disposition column. Quarantined mail should come almost only from the "not ours" group.
- Set p=reject when that holds, and keep reading. Reports around the day of a change can mix old and new policy results.
- Review monthly: new sources appear whenever a team buys a tool that sends email.
Do you need a DMARC report analyzer?
For more than a few domains, yes, or a script of your own. RFC 9989 says reports are formatted so that it is "recommended that they be machine-parsed," and RFC 9990 calls the XML "not human readable in bulk". CISA says such services help, though their use "is not required to receive or read DMARC reports".
Whichever you choose, check three things. The service's domain publishes the confirming record described above. Access to the data is limited, since RFC 9989 says the reporting address "needs controls appropriate to the organizational requirements". And your own script parses files safely, because RFC 9990 warns that malformed reports can carry a "zip bomb or XML bomb".
How can Raileon help?
Our free email security check reads your SPF, DKIM and DMARC records from public DNS in seconds, with no sign-up, and shows whether your policy is at none, quarantine or reject (it reads public records, not your reports). If the records need work, we set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC, then check your real email still gets delivered. On a free 20-minute call with the founder, we list your senders, write the records with whoever runs your email, and plan the move to p=reject.
FAQ
What is a DMARC report?
A summary that receiving mail servers send, usually daily, to the address in your DMARC record's rua tag. It lists each server that sent mail as your domain, how many messages it sent, and whether they passed SPF, DKIM and alignment.
What is the DMARC rua tag?
The part of your DMARC record that lists where aggregate reports go, as mailto addresses separated by commas. Without it, receivers send no aggregate reports.
How often do DMARC aggregate reports arrive?
The standard asks receivers to send them at least once every 24 hours, and each usually covers one UTC day. Expect a separate file from each receiver for each domain with its own DMARC record.
Why are we not getting any DMARC reports?
Check that the record has an rua tag with a mailto address, that the mailbox isn't filtering reports as spam, and that any address at another domain is confirmed in that domain's DNS. CISA says reports should arrive within 48 hours.
Reports arriving, but nobody reading them?
Bring a week of reports, or just your list of domains. On a free 20-minute call, we'll list your senders with you and plan the move to p=reject.
About the author

Konstantin
Founder & CEO, Raileon
Konstantin has spent more than 15 years in systems, processes, automation and development. He has built businesses from scratch, from early crypto to tech ventures that led to acquisitions, and founded Raileon to build the software and automation he wished he'd had.
- 15+ years in IT, automation and development
- Founder & CEO of Raileon
- Based in North Miami, Florida


